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CLAIMS  COURT AT THE  CROSSROADS
Richard  H. Fallon, Jr.  *
The Claims  Court  stands at a  crossroads.  To  cite just  one piece  of evi-
dence, the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen  v. Massachusetts  I has raised
profound questions about the vitality of the Claims Court's traditional role.
In Bowen,  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  the jurisdiction of a  federal  district
court to order the payment of money by the Secretary  of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to the State of Massachusetts under the Medicaid  Program.2
The Court did so over the Secretary's objection that the suit, which involved
an  asserted  obligation to  pay  money  out of the  federal  treasury,  lay  at the
heart  of the traditionally  exclusive jurisdiction  of the  Claims  Court.  The
Supreme  Court  in Bowen  explicitly  rejected  this claim  of exclusive  Claims
Court jurisdiction.3  But Bowen's threat to the Claims Court went even fur-
ther.  The  Supreme  Court  also suggested-although  it did  not hold-that
the case  could not have been  brought in the Claims  Court at all, even if the
plaintiff had preferred to litigate there.  If this is so, the Claims Court's juris-
diction  is significantly  diminished, and  its future  role is  in doubt.
My main thesis, intended to provide a historical perspective on the Claims
Court and its unfolding future, is that Bowen reflects  a simultaneous climax
in two stories that do not, ultimately,  fit together  in  a rational  and  orderly
way.  One  is the  story of sovereign  immunity as  a  generative  constitutional
principle.  This is the story that led to the creation of the Claims Court as an
article I court, authorized  to hear claims against the United States as a mat-
ter  of grace,  not  right.4  This  story  includes  the  principle  that  waivers  of
*  Professor of Law, Harvard  Law School.  This Article  is a slightly  revised  version  of a
lecture  delivered  at the Claims Court Judicial  Conference, November  29,  1990.  I am  grateful
to  Dan Meltzer for helpful  comments  and to John  Parry  for valuable  research  assistance.
1.  487  U.S.  879 (1988).
2.  See id. at  912.
3.  See id. at 905-07.
4.  Congress  created  the Claims  Court  in  1982.  See Federal  Courts  Improvement  Act,
Pub. L. No. 97-164,  § 105(a),  96 Stat. 27,  28  (1982).  Its predecessor,  the Court of Claims, was
created  by the Act of Feb.  24,  1855,  ch.  122,  10 Stat.  612.Catholic University Law Review
sovereign  immunity  will  be  strictly  construed.'  Within  this  story,  suits
against the sovereign  are suspect, even when  allowed,  and should presump-
tively occur  in an article I tribunal,  the Claims Court, with its remedial  ca-
pacities  generally  limited to  awards of money  damages.
The other story that I  want to tell  involves the emergence  of the modern
administrative state.  The administrative state has too much power not to be
accountable  to law.  Within the story of the flowering  of the administrative
state  in  the  twentieth  century,  there  is  a strong  presumption  that  agency
action is reviewable  in article III courts.6  Section 702 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA),1  which  waives  sovereign  immunity  in suits for relief
other than  money  damages,  is  an  important  part  of this  story,  but only  a
part.  This story's basic thrust is that there should be complete and effective
relief for all  governmental  wrongs as a matter of right,  not grace, and that
the preferred  forums are the  federal district courts.
These two stories collided in Bowen v. Massachusetts, and it was the theme
of the  second  story  that prevailed:  the  apparent  technical  obstacles  were
made to  give  way,  and  the  Secretary  of HHS  was  held  suable  for  money
damages  in federal district  court.  Writing  in dissent, Justice  Scalia argued
that the first story,  the story of sovereign  immunity and the Claims Court,
could not, after Bowen,  go on  as before.'  But I  think he was wrong  about
that, as I shall explain in due course.  First, however,  I  need to develop the
two traditions or stories that I have spoken of and to discuss how they relate
to the Claims  Court.
I.  Two TRADITIONS
A.  Sovereign Immunity and the Claims Court
The core of the story that leads to the Claims Court lies in the concept of
sovereign immunity-the idea that the sovereign  cannot be sued without its
consent.  Sovereign  immunity, which originated  in England,  was well estab-
lished in the colonies by the time of the American Revolution.9  The general
understanding  is  that  federal  sovereign  immunity  survived  the  Constitu-
tion.'o  Although the Constitution  creates rights against the government, the
5.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v. King, 395  U.S.  1, 4 (1969).
6.  See,  e.g.,  Abbott  Laboratories  v. Gardner, 387  U.S.  136,  140 (1967).
7.  5 U.S.C. §  702  (1988).
8.  See Bowen  v. Massachusetts,  487  U.S. 879, 913-30  (1988)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting).
9.  See,  e.g.,  L.  JAFFE,  JUDICIAL  CONTROL  OF  ADMINISTRATIVE  ACTION  197-231
(1965).
10.  The Supreme Court has consistently  held that federal sovereign  immunity bars uncon-
sented  suits against the United  States.  See,  e.g.,  Cohens v.  Virginia,  19 U.S.  (6  Wheat.)  264,
411-12  (1821).  Prior to the ratification of the eleventh amendment,  it was a debated  question
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rights generally cannot be enforced through suits directly  against the sover-
eign  unless the sovereign  consents.
Sovereign  immunity  has proved  problematic  from  the beginning,  and for
an  obvious  reason.  It simply  does not mesh  well  with the rule  of law,  and
with the idea of Marbury v. Madison " that ours should be a government  of
laws and not of men.  As a result, there always have been, because there have
had to be, ways around sovereign immunity-some created by courts, others
created  by Congress.  Of the ways created  by courts, by far the most impor-
tant is the device,  and often the fiction, of an "officer suit."' 2  The basic idea
is that although the government  cannot be sued without consent, its officers
can-even  if they get  themselves into legal trouble  only as a result of acting
in  their  capacity  as  government  officers.  If an  official  commits  a tort, the
official  is  and  always  has  been  suable-sometimes  for  an  injunction,  and
sometimes for  damages. 3
There are limits, of course, to the doctrines that permit plaintiffs to evade
sovereign  immunity  by suing an official instead of the government.  Without
such  limitations,  the  concept  of sovereign  immunity  would  not  have  been
significant.  Historically,  two limitations  on the  availability  of officer suits
are  of foremost  importance.  First, suits  against officials  cannot be  used  to
enforce  contracts  against the government,  because the  government,  not the
official,  is the real party  in interest. 4  Second,  except in the most limited of
circumstances,  officer  suits  are not  available  when  the  remedy  sought  is a
payment of money  out of the  state or federal  treasury.' 5  Where  money is
directly at stake,  the fiction that it is the officer who is  being sued, and not
the sovereign,  cannot be  maintained.  These  limits on officer suits  reinforce
the original  premise:  sovereign immunity  is an important doctrine of consti-
tutional  stature, and  the sovereign  cannot be  sued without  its consent.
It bears  repeating,  however,  that the doctrine of sovereign  immunity has
always  been  a  problematic  one,  even  within  the  story  that  affirmed  it.' 6
There  is, accordingly,  a  historical  tradition  of legislatively as  well  as judi-
cially created exceptions.  Suppose that the government  breached a contract,
whether state  sovereign  immunity had  similarly  survived  the Constitution's ratification.  See,
e.g.,  Engdahl, Immunity and  Accountability  for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L.
REV.  1, 9-11  (1972).  Even today, the relationship between the eleventh  amendment  and state
sovereign  remains  a subject of debate.
11.  5 U.S. (I  Cranch)  137  (1803).
12.  7ee,  e.g.,  L.  JAFFE, supra note  9, at 232-60.
13.  .;ee, e.g.,  Engdahl, supra note  10.
14.  See L. JAFFE, supra note 9,  at 221.
15.  See Fallon  & Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional  Remedies,  104
HARV.  L.  REV.  1731,  1782-83  (1991).
16.  See id. at  1781-86.
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or refused  to pay  money  that it  had  a  duty  to pay.  In  these  cases,  officer
suits would  typically  not have  provided effective  relief under any judicially
created  exception to sovereign  immunity." 7  As a result,  Congress,  from the
very outset of American constitutionalism,  has thought it necessary  to pro-
vide  for such cases.  Initially  Congress did so through a  system of "private
bills,"  under which aggrieved  persons would lobby their congressmen to in-
troduce legislation  calling for individualized  compensation from  the federal
treasury.  Congress enacted  an  average of a thousand  private bills per  year
during some parts of the early  19th  century." 8  But Congress felt sufficiently
burdened by the responsibility of fact-finding that it tried repeatedly to pass
this  job  onto  agents  and  agencies  that  would  report  back  to  it  with
recommendations. 1 9
Inevitably,  however,  there  were  problems.  Although  informal  tribunals
could find facts, there was no system of precedent, and claims tended to be
filed  on  a  hit-or-miss  basis.  In addition,  even  after  the  tribunals  reported
back to  Congress,  it remained  cumbersome  for Congress  to  have  to  enact
bills providing for  compensation  in individual cases.
Ultimately, Congress gave up and created  a system that evolved into what
we now know as the Claims Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.  Judges  were commissioned  as  early as  1855,  though  the Court  of
Claims thus  set up soon  became a  mere  advisory body. 2°  Congress  estab-
lished a genuinely judicial  court in  1863,2  the judicial  status of which was
confirmed  in  1866.22  Twenty-one  years later, Congress enacted  the Tucker
Act2 3 and conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Claims in cases  presenting
claims against the government  not sounding in tort.  Officer  suits  remained
the  vehicle for tort claims.
We can skip over most of the Claims Court's subsequent history, except to
note a few conceptual points.  First, much  influenced by the tradition of sov-
ereign immunity, the Tucker Act assumes that an article III trial court is not
required in suits against the government.  Because suing the government is a
matter  of grace,  not right,  the government  can attach  strings.  Second,  the
government's  consent  to suit  is limited:  outside of expressed,  statutory  ex-
ceptions,  money  damages  are  the only  remedy  available  under  the  Tucker
17.  See id. at  1781-83.
18.  See, e.g.,  Wiecek, The Origin of  the United States Court of Claims, 20 ADMIN.  L.  REV.
387,  392-93  (1968).
19.  See id. at  390-91.
20.  Id. at  395.
21.  Act of March  3, 1863,  ch. 92,  12 Stat. 765.
22.  Act of March  17,  1866,  ch.  19,  14  Stat.  9.
23.  Ch.  359,  24 Stat.  505  (1887)  (codified  as amended  at  28 U.S.C. § 1491  (1988)).
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Act.24  Third, within this unfolding story, statutes authorizing  the payment
of money  are  to be  strictly  construed.25  Waiving  sovereign  immunity  is  a
serious matter, not something lightly inferred.  All of these themes are famil-
iar  in the history  and  practice of the Claims  Court.
There is an obvious objection to the way I have developed the story so far.
From another  perspective,  the enactment of the Tucker Act and  the estab-
lishment  of the Claims Court would not stand within the tradition of sover-
eign  immunity, but would mark a departure from  it.  Immunity is, after all,
waived.  Further,  the  Claims  Court,  in  construing  its jurisdiction,  has  fre-
quently done so with the specific aim of promoting justice.  For example, the
court  has  upheld  its own jurisdiction to entertain claims for the recovery  of
money  that  was illegally exacted,  even  though such  cases might be  pleaded
as tort actions against individual officers,  and even in cases in which no stat-
ute specifically  created  a right to repayment. 26  This objection  does not lack
for  plausibility.  But  it shows a tension  at the heart of the Tucker  Act and
the jurisdiction of the Claims Court that is better explained  as an outgrowth
of the problematic tradition of sovereign  immunity.  For it is the very fact of
sovereign  immunity,  and  the  need  for  its  waiver,  that  explains  why  the
Claims Court is  an article  I court  rather than  an article III court; why the
Claims Court  has  never  had jurisdiction  over  tort claims  (which  were not
actionable against the government  at all  until the enactment  of the Federal
Tort Claims Act in  194627);  and why the Claims Court's remedial capacity is
generally limited to money damages.  To understand the development of the
Claims Court  and  the  definition  of its jurisdiction,  we  must  tell  a story  in
which sovereign  immunity  plays a crucial,  generative  role.2"
B.  Judicial Review of the Administrative State
I  now  want  to  describe  a  rival  tradition  that  unfolds  into a  rival  story.
Sovereign  immunity is an old doctrine, which was most at home in the  18th
24.  Although  not mandated  by  the language  of the statute, judicial  interpretations  are
clear on this point.  See, e.g.,  United  States v.  King, 395 U.S.  1 (1969);  United States  v. Jones,
131  U.S.  1 (1889).
25.  United  States  v.  Testan,  424 U.S.  392, 399-400  (1976);  King, 395 U.S.  at 4.
26.  See, e.g.,  Eastport  S.S. Corp. v.  United  States, 372 F.2d  1002 (Ct.  CI.  1967);  Clapp v.
United  States,  117 F. Supp. 576 (Ct. Cl.),  cert. denied, 348  U.S.  834  (1954).
27.  Ch.  753,  60  Stat.  842  (1946)  (codified  as amended at  28  U.S.C.  §  1346  (1988)).
28.  The jurisdiction  of the Claims Court under the Tucker Act, dating from  its 19th  cen-
tury  origins,  has  operated  at  the  traditional,  functional  center  of the  doctrine  of sovereign
immunity.  I  use the term  "functional  center" advisedly,  for even though an  express waiver of
sovereign  immunity existed  in contract  and takings cases before tort cases, that is because tort
actions  always  lay  outside the functional,  if not  the conceptual,  core of sovereign  immunity.
Tort  cases  could  always  be  pleaded  as  officer  suits, with  either  damages  or injunctive  relief
available  against  the tort-feasing  officer  in his individual  capacity.
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and  19th century worlds of limited government.  The watchman  state of the
18th century  kept the peace and  operated  the mails, but did  relatively little
else.  Within  such  a  regime,  it  seemed  less difficult  to  reconcile  sovereign
immunity  with  the rule  of law through suits against  individual  officers who
committed torts than it does within the administrative state that has grown
up since.  Today,  as we  all know, a  vast governmental  bureaucracy  has as-
sumed  responsibility  for  managing  the  economy  and  administering  social
service programs  upon which millions of people depend for their livelihoods.
The administrative  state  developed  gradually,  largely  through  the  estab-
lishment  of what  we  now  call  administrative  agencies.  Nevertheless,  it is
striking that Congress, almost from the beginning, has thought it practically
if not  constitutionally  necessary to  subject  the most important  decisions  of
administrative agencies to review in article III courts.29  The development  of
the  administrative  and  welfare  bureaucracy  has  thus  stood  largely-
although  not  wholly--outside  the  tradition  of sovereign  immunity.30  An
unelected  bureaucracy  with  so  much power  simply  has  to  be  accountable,
and the means of accountability that lay readiest  at hand was that of judicial
review.  By  1902,  a  common law  of judicial  review  had developed. 31  Most
statutes  establishing  and  empowering  administrative  agencies  specifically
provide for judicial review of their decisions.32  The APA, enacted in  1946, 33
reflects  a  strong presumption  that  such  review  will be  available.  The  1976
amendment to section  702 of the APA,  which explicitly  waives any residue
of federal  sovereign  immunity in suits against federal  officials  not involving
claims for money damages, is an extension of this tradition.  The  House Re-
port  on  the  bill  that  became  section  702  termed  sovereign  immunity  an
"anachronism[]"  that had  "outlived  [its]  usefulness.' '34
C.  The Potential  for Collision
The two traditions that I have identified--one embracing  sovereign immu-
nity and  permitting  only  limited  suability  of government  and  the other re-
29.  As Professor Jaffe explains,  "The availability of judicial  review is the necessary condi-
tion, psychologically  if not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be
legitimate, or legally  valid."  L.  JAFFE, supra  note 9,  at  320.
30.  See generally L. JAFFE, supra note 9, at 353-76 (sovereign  immunity has traditionally
been applied  to enforcement  of contracts  and  equitable  claims against  government  property).
31.  See  American  School of Magnetic  Healing v. McAnnulty,  187 U.S.  94 (1902).
32.  See,  e.g..  15  U.S.C.  § 57a(e)  (1988)  (providing  for review  of Federal  Trade Commis-
sion  rules).
33.  Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)  (codi-
fied as amended  in scattered  sections  5 U.S.C. (1988)).
34.  H.R. REP. No.  1656, 94th  Cong.,  2d Sess. 20, reprinted in  1976 U.S.  CODE  CONG.  &
ADMIN.  NEws 6121,  6140.
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jecting sovereign  immunity and  treating review in an article III court as the
norm-are inconsistent,  at least in terms of their underlying  spirits and as-
sumptions.  They have not often collided, however.  Generally, the sovereign
immunity tradition has prevailed in suits that fall within that tradition's  his-
torical, functional  core-in suits  for money  damages  and  in actions  to  en-
force contracts and to procure compensation for takings.35  Such suits could
often be brought, but generally  only in the Claims Court, and only as a mat-
ter of explicit  legislative grace.  The competing  tradition of full judicial over-
sight and effective remedies has more often prevailed  in cases in which other,
non-compensatory  relief is sought.
But collision obviously can occur, as when a question arises about whether
a particular suit is or is not a suit for money  damages, or whether  a border-
line  suit lies  within the jurisdiction of the  Claims  Court or of a federal  dis-
trict  court.  If a  suit  is  within  the jurisdiction  of  the  Claims  Court,  the
philosophy of the sovereign immunity tradition and the Tucker Act calls  for
statutes  purportedly  authorizing  the payment  of money  to  be  strictly  con-
strued  and  for relief generally  to be  limited  to  money damages.  If, on the
other hand, the suit can  be brought in  a federal district court, the immanent
philosophy  of the  administrative  state,  symbolized  by  section  702  of the
APA  and  its  waiver  of  sovereign  immunity  in  non-damages  actions,  will
view  sovereign immunity  as virtually  a historical  anachronism.
A  collision  thus  occurs  at the  point  of the jurisdictional  determination.
Based upon  the language of the relevant statutes, if a suit is for money dam-
ages  and does  not  sound  in tort,  it  cannot  be  heard  in  the  federal  district
courts if the amount in controversy is more than $10,000.36  If the dispute is
not a suit for money  damages, so that it can be heard  in the federal district
courts under section  702, then  it apparently cannot be  heard in the  Claims
Court .
35.  But cf  First  English  Evangelical  Lutheran  Church  v.  County  of Los  Angeles,  482
U.S.  304 (1987).  To the extent  that Congress has explicitly  considered  the matter at all,  this
seems to have  been Congress's  intent. Congress,  in  enacting section  702,  limited its reach  to
suits  not  seeking  money  damages  and  indicated  that  no  suit  should  be  available  in  federal
district court if there were an adequate  remedy  available  under the Tucker Act.  Id.  at  12-13.
36.  28 U.S.C. §  1346(a)(2) (1988).  APA section 702 independently calls for this result:  it
excludes suits  for  money  damages  from  its  waiver  of sovereign  immunity and  concomitant
authorization to sue the government.  5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).  APA section 704 also bars suit in
district court directly  under the APA where there  is an  "adequate  remedy  in  a court"  under
any other statute.  5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
37.  Although the language of the Tucker Act does  not expressly  limit the Claims  Court's
jurisdiction  to  suits  for  money  damages,  this  construction  is  generally  settled.  See  United
States v. Jones,  131  U.S.  1 (1889).
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II.  BOWEN  AND  THE  TRADITIONS
Bowen v. Massachusetts 38 exhibits  the tension between  the two traditions
that I have  described.  The dispute  in Bowen involved the administration  of
the Medicaid  program.  Medicaid  is a complicated federal-state program, in
which participating states, as long as they stay within bounds established  by
federal statutes and regulations,  are expected to develop their own standards
of eligibility and covered  services.  The federal grants to the states to run the
program,  which  are  called  "reimbursements,"  are  paid  quarterly,  based
upon  the  states'  estimates  of their  anticipated  future  expenditures.39  In
Bowen,  the Secretary  of Health and Human Services (HHS) decided to "dis-
allow"  Massachusetts's claim to funding for a particular, narrow category of
rehabilitative services.
40
Following HHS's disallowance, which was based on the Secretary's inter-
pretation  of the statute,  Massachusetts  brought  a  suit  for  declaratory  and
injunctive relief in the Federal District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts.41 The  state  claimed  authorization  to  sue  under  section  702  of the
APA,  which waives sovereign  immunity  in suits against the federal  govern-
ment seeking relief "other than money  damages."4 2  The Secretary  objected
not  to  the  fact  of suit, but  to the  court  in  which  the  suit  was  filed.  The
Secretary  argued that  the  suit  was a  suit for  money  damages,  because  the
state's aim  was to secure  payment  of money  from the federal  treasury,  and
that the action  therefore had  to be brought  in the Claims Court.43
The Secretary  had  two arguments.  First,  the suit was not authorized  by
section  702  because  the Commonwealth  of Massachusetts  sought monetary
relief  and  section  702  is  expressly  limited  to  cases  seeking  non-monetary
remedies."4  Second,  the suit was independently  barred by section 704 of the
APA, which allows suits directly under the APA only when no other statute
provides  "an  adequate  remedy  in  court.' 45  According  to  the  Secretary,
there was an adequate remedy  in a suit for damages  in the Claims  Court.46
38.  487 U.S.  879 (1988).  For a thorough discussion of Bowen, see Noone & Lester, Defin-
ing Tucker Act Jurisdiction After Bowen  v. Massachusetts,  40 CATH.  U.L.  REV.  571  (1991).
39.  See  42 U.S.C.  §  1396b(d)  (1988).
40.  See  42 U.S.C.  §  1396b(d)(5).
41.  Bowen,  487 U.S.  at  887.
42.  5 U.S.C.  § 702  (1988).
43.  Bowen, 487 U.S.  at  888-89.
44.  See id.
45. 5 U.S.C.  § 704 (1988).
46.  See Bowen,  487  U.S. at  891.
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The  Supreme  Court,  by  a  6-3  majority,47  upheld  the jurisdiction  of the
federal  district court.  The Court stated first that the case could  go forward
in  the  district  court  because  the  plaintiff was  not  seeking  "money  dam-
ages." 4  The basis for this  holding is unclear.  At one point, the Court sug-
gests  that  the  framing  of  the  prayer  for  relief  is  crucial;  although
Massachusetts  wanted money out of the federal  treasury, it expressly prayed
for declaratory  and injunctive  relief, not damages.49  This,  however,  seems
too  broad  a  basis  to  provide  persuasive  support  for  the  Court's  holding.
Every claim for damages could be styled as a request for an injunction order-
ing the defendant  to pay money.' 0  As a  second ground  for its holding,  the
Court suggested  that money  due under a grant  program does not constitute
damages."1  Damages,  the  Court  reasoned,  compensate  for  a  wrong  done.
By contrast, an order to pay money under a grant program does not provide
compensation  for an injury, but rather creates  a  situation in which there is
no injury, because  the plaintiff obtains the  very thing denied. 2
Having  determined  that the case  was not a  suit  for money  damages,  the
Bowen  Court went on to find that because  there was no adequate remedy in
the  Claims  Court, jurisdiction  in  federal  district  court  was  not barred  by
APA  section  704.  The  Court's  reasoning  was  again  opaque.  There  were
hints  of  several  explanations,  of which  two  deserve  notice.  First,  even  if
there could be a  remedy in the Claims Court, the Supreme Court suggested
that  the possibility  of getting  "damages"  after  the  fact  would not  be  "ade-
quate"  for  the  state  within  the  meaning  of section  704,  because  the  state
needs  to  be  able  to  plan  its future  activities  in  light  of firm  revenue  esti-
mates.'"  Second,  the Supreme Court raised  the possibility that there might
not  in  fact  be  a remedy  available  in  the  Claims  Court  at all.  The  Claims
Court can grant damages  under the Tucker Act only  where  Congress man-
dates this  relief, and  in Bowen  the Court thought  it unclear that Congress
had done sO.'
4  Although  the  statutory  scheme  put  HHS  under a duty  to
make  payments  to  states complying  with  applicable  federal guidelines,  the
Court found it uncertain that Congress had intended the relevant substantive
statutes to mandate payments  in compensation  for  past  wrongs.  Congress
may have had no such remedial intent when  it enacted the substantive stat-
47.  Justice  Stevens wrote  the majority  opinion,  which  was joined by  four other Justices.
Justice  White concurred  in the judgment only.
48.  Bowen,  487  U.S.  at 893-901.
49. Id. at 893,  900.
50.  See  id. at 915-16  (Scalia, J.,  dissenting).
51.  Id. at 897-98.
52.  Id. at 900-01.
53.  Id.  at  905-07.
54.  Id. at 905  n.42.
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utes, the Court reasoned, because Congress might have been counting on the
relief in the  federal  district  courts  that, in  the absence  of special  statutory
provision,  is available  under the APA." 5
This is  all very  complicated,  but two things stand out.  Let me focus  on
them.  First,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  suits  against  the  United  States
seeking the payment of money out of the federal treasury  may sometimes be
brought in the federal district courts,  rather than the Claims  Court, on the
theory  that they are suits for declaratory  and  injunctive relief, not suits for
money  damages.  Second,  the  Supreme  Court suggested,  but  did  not hold,
that suits that could be brought in federal district court on this theory could
not under  any circumstances  be brought  in the Claims Court  because they
do not  seek  "damages,"  but  rather  money  to  which  the  plaintiff claims  a
legal  right.
III.  CLEANING  UP  AFTER  THE  COLLISION
Where does  this leave us in terms of the two stories that I  have been tell-
ing,  about competing  traditions  that Bowen  brought into  collision?  It may
help  to separate  two  questions.  First,  which  cases  in which  plaintiffs  seek
monetary  relief from  the United  States  can now  be  brought  in  the federal
district courts?  Second, what does Bowen mean  for the jurisdiction, and the
future,  of the Claims  Court?
A.  District Court Jurisdiction
After Bowen,  the outer bounds of district court jurisdiction  in suits seek-
ing money from the United States are hard to identify.  The requirements are
that the suits must seek a form of monetary relief other than "damages"  and
that the Claims Court remedy must not be "adequate." 5 6  Exactly how these
two  criteria  fit  together  is  not  wholly  clear.  The  facts of Bowen  seem  to
establish  that suits  arising  out  of the  operation  of federal  grant  programs
generally  lie  within the  district  courts'  jurisdiction.  It is  a  good  deal  less
clear  that Bowen  should  be  read  to  extend  the jurisdiction  of the district
courts  to  the  contract57  and  takings  cases  that  were  the  traditional,  func-
tional heart of the federal tradition of sovereign immunity.  The relief sought
in such cases is easily classifiable  as "damages,"  and a Claims Court remedy
might well  be held  "adequate."  It seems  significant  that Bowen involved  a
grant  program in which the central, operating rules of a  classic administra-
55.  Id.
56.  See supra text  accompanying  notes 47-55.
57.  See, e.g.,  Eagle-Picher Indus.,  Inc.,  v. United  States, 901  F.2d 1530,  1532  & n.1 (10th
Cir.  1990);  Rieschick v.  United  States,  21  CI. Ct.  621,  625-26 (1990).
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tive  state bureaucracy  potentially  affected  a  stream of payments over time,
not a  one-time claim  of entitlement.58
B.  Claims  Court Jurisdiction
Does the possibility  of jurisdiction  in  a federal  district court-notably  in
suits  involving  federal  grant  programs-necessarily  defeat  the  Claims
Court's jurisdiction?  Dissenting in Bowen,  Justice Scalia argued that it did.
So  far,  however,  the  Claims  Court has  resisted  Justice  Scalia's  conclusion.
In several important cases involving the administration  of federal grant pro-
grams,  including Kentucky ex  rel. Cabinet for Human  Resources v.  United
States 9  and  City of Wheeling v. United States,"°  the Claims Court has held
that it retains jurisdiction.  Bowen,  the Claims  Court has  reasoned, was  ex-
plicitly about federal district court jurisdiction, not that of the Claims Court,
and  because  the Supreme  Court did not discuss prior Federal  Circuit  cases
upholding  Claims  Court jurisdiction,  those  cases  are  still  binding  on  the
Claims  Court.  Will the  Claims  Court decisions  that reach  this  conclusion
withstand  analysis?
It is easy to develop a logical argument that district court jurisdiction  im-
plies  lack  of jurisdiction  in  the  Claims  Court.  The  cause  of action  that
Bowen  recognized  rests  on section  702 of the APA.  This section  states  ex-
plicitly that "[n]othing  herein  ...  confers  [district court]  authority to grant
relief  if any  other statute that  grants consent  to  suit  [for  money  damages]
expressly  or impliedly  forbids the  relief which  is sought." '6'  Moreover,  the
congressional  committee  reports  make  clear  Congress'  understanding  that
the Tucker Act, by  authorizing suits  for damages  in the Claims Court, im-
pliedly forbids suit in the district courts.62  In other words, Congress clearly
seems to have contemplated that there can be no suit in federal district court
if the suit can instead be brought in the Claims Court under the Tucker Act.
Thus,  if Bowen-type  cases  can  be  brought  in  the  federal district  courts,  it
seems  to follow that they cannot be  brought in the Claims  Court.63
58.  The Supreme  Court  in Bowen  distinguished  the Federal  Circuit's  decision  in  Chula
Vista  City School  District v.  Bennett, 824  F.2d  1573  (Fed.  Cir.  1987), cert. denied,  484  U.S.
1042 (1988),  on this basis.  See Bowen, 487 U.S. at  882 n.i.  The Claims Court has relied on this
distinction  in  post-Bowen  cases.  See, e.g.,  City  of Wheeling v. United  States,  20  Cl.  Ct.  659
(1990),  aff'd without opinion, 928 F.2d 410 (Fed. Cir.  1991);  Rieschick v. United  States, 21 Cl.
Ct. 621,  625-26  (1990).
59.  16 Cl.  Ct.  755, 759-62  (1989).
60.  20 Cl.  Ct. at 662-65.
61.  5 U.S.C.  § 702 (1988).
62.  H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th Cong.,  2d Sess.  12-13,  reprinted  in  1976 U.S.  CODE CONG.
& ADMIN.  NEWS  6133.
63.  See  Bowen  v. Massachusetts,  487  U.S.  879,  915 (1988)  (Scalia, J.,  dissenting).
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It is impossible to conclude definitively whether this argument will prevail
in  the  Court  of Appeals for  the  Federal  Circuit  or in  the Supreme  Court.
My guess, however,  is that this argument will  not prevail.  To explain why,
let me  begin  with Holmes's famous aphorism:
The life of the law has not been logic:  it has been experience.  The
felt  necessities  of the time, the  prevalent moral and political theo-
ries, intuitions  of public  policy,  avowed  or unconscious,  even  the
prejudices  which judges  share  with  their fellow-men,  have had  a
good  deal  more to do than the syllogism  in determining  the  rules
by  which men  should be  governed.64
The argument that federal district court jurisdiction must preclude Claims
Court jurisdiction  is a  "logical"  argument,  which  assumes that the  various
pieces of the jurisdictional puzzle can and must fit together:  if a claim can be
heard  by  the  federal  district  courts,  it  therefore  cannot be  heard  by  the
Claims Court.  Experience suggests,  however, that the pieces of the jurisdic-
tional  puzzle do not always  fit together  neatly.  As  my account  of the two
legal traditions was meant to suggest,  the Claims Court and the Tucker Act
are located  in one legal  tradition, built on  the central  concept of sovereign
immunity, while the jurisdiction of the federal district courts under the APA
reflects  a quite different tradition.  These traditions did not cohere very well
before Bowen,  and  there  is  no  reason  to think  they  will cohere  any  better
afterward.
Indeed,  the  Supreme Court  in Bowen  opened  the door to  the possibility
that a case might involve a claim for money damages for purposes of Claims
Court jurisdiction, even if it would be deemed a claim for non-damages  relief
if it were  filed in federal district court.  By explicitly limiting  its pronounce-
ment that there might not be Claims Court jurisdiction on the facts of Bowen
to the status of a suggestion, the Supreme Court appeared  to signal that the
district  court could  have jurisdiction,  even  if the  Claims Court  might also
have taken jurisdiction,  had  the plaintiff made a different  forum choice.
65
It is here that Holmes's allusion to "felt  necessities"  may be relevant.  Be-
hind  the  refined  legal  argumentation,  the  Supreme  Court's  purpose  in up-
holding federal district court jurisdiction in Bowen was probably to allow the
plaintiff its choice of forum,  in this case a  federal district court, where  com-
plete  relief was available.  That purpose  would not  require  excluding  from
the  Claims Court  a  plaintiff who  chose,  for whatever  reason,  to  bring  suit
there.
64.  0. HOLMES,  THE  COMMON  LAW  1  (1881).
65.  See Bowen,  487 U.S. at 904-05 ("the availability of any review of a disallowance  deci-
sion in  the Claims Court  is doubtful") (emphasis  added).
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In short, my guess is that the practical effect of Bowen  will be to establish
concurrent  federal district  court  and  Claims  Court jurisdiction  in cases  in-
volving the administration  of federal grant programs.66  As a formal matter,
the Claims Court's jurisdiction will not be substantially limited.  As a practi-
cal matter, however,  many plaintiffs who previously would have sued in the
Claims Court may now choose  to proceed  instead in  a federal district court,
because district courts have the capacity  to grant more complete, non-dam-
ages relief.  Bowen thus reflects a considerable  triumph of the legal tradition
that denigrates  sovereign  immunity  and  prefers review  by  article III courts
over the tradition that exalts  sovereign  immunity and gives a central  role to
the Claims Court.
C.  Assessing the Claims Court's Loss
If. iowen  implies  that  many  more  cases  now can  be  brought  in  federal
district  court  instead  of in the  Claims Court, there  is no reason,  pragmati-
cally,  to  regret this development.  One  of the striking things  about the fact
situation in Bowen is that there was no strong, functional reason-outside  of
66.  There  is a  potential  obstacle  to this conclusion.  The Supreme  Court  in  Bowen  sug-
gested  a possible  stiffening in  the test  for satisfying  the  Tucker Act's jurisdictional  require-
ments for claims  founded  on a statute.  The Court  suggested  that for a damages claim  to be
properly  founded on a statute,  the statute must not only mandate  the payment of money, but
also must expressly or impliedly  create  a cause of action to compensate  for past wrongs.  See
Bowen,  487 U.S.  at 905 n.42; see also Maryland  Dep't of Human Resources  v.  HHS, 763 F.2d
1441,  1450-51  (D.C. Cir.  1985)  (Title XX of the Social Security  Act held  not to create a right
in the state to recover  money damages for allegedly misspent funds).  Again, purpose is crucial.
The purpose  that  moved the  Supreme  Court  to uphold  district  court jurisdiction  in  Bowen,
respecting the plaintiff's  forum choice, does not suggest that Claims Court jurisdiction should
be barred when preferred by the plaintiffs.  Thus, the Supreme Court explicitly stated in Bowen
that federal  district court jurisdiction could be upheld  even on  the supposition  that a damages
remedy  was available in the Claims Court.  See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 901-08.  The suggestion that
there might be no remedy at all in the Claims Court was an alternative foundation for conclud-
ing  that APA  section  704  did not  bar the suit.  A slightly  different  route  yielding  the same
result  would  be to  base Tucker  Act jurisdiction  on  the ground  that  the federal  government
enters into implied contracts when it enters cooperative  funding arrangements.  See, e.g.,  Com-
monwealth of Ky.  ex rel. Cabinet For Human Resources v.  United States,  16 Cl.  Ct. 755,  762
(1989)  (Child  Support Enforcement  Program  administered  by  the HHS  under the  Social  Se-
curity Act).
Claims Court jurisdiction over illegal exaction  claims should be expected  to survive  for simi-
lar reasons.  Illegal  exaction claims are one of the two distinct kinds of claims for money under
the Tucker  Act that the court distinguished in  Eastport  S.S.  Corp. v.  United  States,  372 F.2d
1002 (Ct. Cl.  1967).  See U.S.  v.  Testan, 424  U.S.  392,  401-02 (1976)  (approving the distinc-
tion).  In such cases, the court implied, there was no need for a law that expressly or impliedly
grants a right to payment of a certain  sum.  Illegal  exaction  claims would thus not seem to be
threatened by the Supreme Court's suggestion that the Claims Court might lack jurisdiction in
a  case  such  as  Bowen  because  the  Medicaid  Act  may  create  no  statutory  right  to  sue  for
money.
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a sort of worshipful stance toward sovereign immunity-to prefer having the
case brought  in the Claims Court.  The general  administration  of the Medi-
caid  Act  is  not an  area in which  the Claims  Court has  specialized  subject
matter expertise.  Plaintiffs can  bring some Medicaid cases, arising on other
bases,  in the  federal  courts of appeals of various  circuits.6 7  There was,  ac-
cordingly, no possibility of achieving  uniformity by placing  all cases  within
the jurisdiction  of a single court.  Moreover, the  federal district courts may
be more convenient for many plaintiffs.  In cases involving a mix of state and
federal law, the federal district courts may also be closer to the relevant local
law.68
IV.  THE CLAIMS  COURT'S  FUTURE
If the federal district courts  are appropriate  forums for cases  like Bowen,
does  this mean  that  the Claims  Court  will or  should become  an  anachro-
nism?  There  is  reason  to think not.  The jurisdiction of the  Claims Court,
from  the beginning,  rested  on two very  different  sorts  of hypotheses.  The
first was that sovereign  immunity made suits against the federal government
a matter  of grace,  not  right.  The second  was  that  a  specialized  tribunal
would achieve enhanced accuracy and efficiency through the development of
subject  matter expertise.  Even if sovereign  immunity  is  a  fading tradition,
the  interest  in  achieving  the  benefits  of tribunals  with  specialized  subject
matters remains important.  Congress has recently created a Veterans Court
on  this  model.69  The  Bankruptcy  Court,70  the  Court  of  International
Trade,7"  the Court of Military Appeals,72  and the Tax Court"' furnish other
examples.
If I had to hazard a guess, it would be that the future of the Claims Court,
whether  as  a  result of legislation or of creative judicial  lawmaking,  will  in-
creasingly  be that of a specialized  tribunal,  with expertise  in particular sub-
ject  areas.  Such  specialization  already  exists  with  respect  to  government
contracts and  takings cases.  The category  of money claims against the gov-
ernment not sounding in tort, however, is simply too sprawling to permit the
benefits  of a truly  specialized tribunal.  No real,  specialized  expertise  could
span  the entire  field.  Yet  it  takes  real  specialization,  to  the extent  that  it
67.  See Bowen,  487  U.S.  at 908.
68.  See id.
69.  38  U.S.C.  § 4051  (1988).
70.  Bankruptcy  Amendments and  Federal Judgeship  Act of  1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,  98
Stat. 333  (codified as  amended at  28  U.S.C.  §  151  (1988)).
71.  28  U.S.C.  § 251  (1988).
72.  10 U.S.C.  §.867  (1988).
73.  26 U.S.C.  §  7441  (1988).
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exists or could be  made to exist, to create  a functional  interest in achieving
exclusive,  or  relatively  exclusive, jurisdiction  in  the  Claims  Court, and  to
supply a policy-based  rationale-which  was  missing in Bowen-for exclud-
ing jurisdiction by the  federal district courts.
Presently,  the  Claims  Court  is  an  anomaly  in  the  federal jurisdictional
scheme:  a somewhat generalist article I court.  We have article I courts with
specialized  subject  matter  expertise.  We  have  article  III  courts  with  a
proudly generalist tradition.  But we have no article I courts, with the partial
exception of the Claims Court, that are not justified by the asserted benefits
of specialization.  An anomaly of this kind may do no particular harm, but it
is  hard to see how it could do much particular good,  either.  To paraphrase
Holmes again, it would be discomfiting to have no better justification for the
existence  of a peculiar  kind of court than that it happened  to be  set up that
way  in the  19th century.74
Insofar  as  the benefits  of specialization  are involved,  the Claims  Court's
article  I  status should  provide no barrier to the expansion  of its jurisdiction
in  virtually  any  plausible  direction.  The Supreme  Court  recently  tried  to
explain  the permissibility  of adjudication by  non-article  III courts  in terms
of the  public rights tradition-a concept that closely  overlaps that of sover-
eign immunity.75  There is, however, a better basis, which is already reflected
in the statutory  structure surrounding  the  Claims  Court.  Initial  adjudica-
tion by an article I tribunal should be permissible whenever there is adequate
appellate review by an article III court, such as the Court of Appeals for the
Federal  Circuit.76  Indeed,  it  would  be  my  guess  that the relationship  be-
tween the Claims Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-
one an article I trial court, the other an article III appellate court--defines  a
model that will be widely followed in providing specialized  and unified adju-
dication in other areas  in the years  ahead.
V.  CONCLUSION
The current structure for judicial  review of claims against the government
is  made  up of two  halves that  do not cohere.  Bowen  showed  this.  In  his
dissent in Bowen, Justice Scalia suggested that the half rooted in the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act and favoring fully effective remedies from the federal
district courts might have obliterated the other half, the one growing out of
74.  Cf Holmes,  The Path of the Law,  10 HARV.  L. REV.  457, 469 (1897)  ("It is revolting
to have no better  reason for a rule  of law than that so  it was laid down  in  the time  of Henry
IV.").
75.  See, e.g.,  Granfinanciera,  S.A.  v.  Nordberg,  492 U.S.  33  (1989).
76.  See Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative  Agencies, and  Article III, 101  HARV.
L.  REV.  916  (1988).
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the tradition of sovereign  immunity, in which the Claims  Court is located.77
Justice Scalia is probably wrong, at least in part:  although the jurisdiction of
the federal  district courts is expanded  in cases challenging the management
of federal  grant programs, the jurisdiction of the Claims Court is not obliter-
ated.  In the future, Bowen could conceivably be rethought, but it is doubtful
that  it  should  be.  Currently,  there  is  no  strong  rationale  for  preferring
Claims  Court jurisdiction  in  cases  like Bowen.  The  future  of the  Claims
Court  should  be  determined  through  consideration  of  the  categories  in
which the court does or could possess sufficient, specialized  expertise to war-
rant  its exercising  relatively  exclusive jurisdiction.  It  is difficult  to  predict
how things will turn out.  The years ahead,  however, should be as intellectu-
ally exciting as they are likely to be anxious for those who work in this area.
77.  Bowen  v. Massachusetts,  487 U.S.  879, 917  (1988)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting).
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